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War was declared at Robbers Cave,
Oklahoma in the summer of 1954 (Sherif
et al., 1961). Of course, if you have seen
one war you have seen them all, but this
was an interesting war, as wars go, because
only the observers knew what the fighting
was about. How, then, did this war differ
from any other war? This one was caused,
conducted, and concluded by behavioral
scientists. After years of religious, political,
and economic wars, this was, perhaps, the
first scientific war. It wasn’t the kind of
war that an adventurer could join just for
the thrill of it. To be eligible, ideally, you
had to be an eleven-year-old, middle-class,
American, Protestant, well-adjusted boy
who was willing to go to an experimental
camp.
The war was designed to have three suc-
cessive stages:
Stage No. 1. Experimental In-Group
Formation. During the first six days, two
groups of boys were brought to camp and
kept isolated geographically from each other
while they solidified themselves into iden-
tifiable and meaningful groups. These &dquo;boy
nation-states&dquo; came to be known, respec-
tively, as the Rattlers and the Eagles.
Stage No. 2. Intergroup Relations-Fric-
tion Phase. During this week, the two
groups were brought into contact in a se-
ries of competitive group activities and mu-
tually frustrating situations which produced
a high level of intergroup hostility.
Stage No. 3. Intergroup Relations-Inte-
gration Phase. This final phase was dedi-
cated to the experimental reduction of the
intergroup enmity by means of the intro-
duction of superordinate goals. The attain-
ment of these desirable and compelling
goals could only be achieved through the
mutual, cooperative efforts of the Rattlers
and the Eagles.
A preliminary experiment was conducted
just prior to Stage No. 3. Simple proximity
and the opportunity for contact was ar-
ranged between the groups in a series of
situations such as participating in psycho-
logical experiments, attending a movie to-
gether, and eating in the same mess hall.
78
This exposure of hostiles to one another
produced jeers, catcalls, insults, a food-
throwing fight, and similar provocations and
outrages. While the convinced practitioners
of contact-as-a-hostility-reducer might well
call &dquo;foul&dquo; and insist that this was hardly
an adequate test of the theory, it at least
demonstrated that the minimum conditions
for the reduction of hostility must include
some motivation to use such an opportunity
productively. Had association been forced
over a long enough period of time it is pos-
sible that the intergroup hostility might
well have dissolved leaving traces only in
the form of a few lingering individual ani-
mosities. There was (as there always is)
unequal dedication to the joys of warfare
among the individual combatants on both
sides and even frenzied lectures about &dquo;what
we are fighting for&dquo; might have proved in-
sufficient to prevent the eventual appear-
ance of peaceful overtures between mem-
bers of each of the groups.
How was the concept of superordinate
goals actually translated into action? The
children were induced to interact in situ-
ations such as the following:
1. The Drinking Water Problems - A
camp water shortage was elaborately staged
(valves turned off 11/4 miles from camp,
faucets plugged, etc.) and the help of all
the children was &dquo;required&dquo; to relieve the
common thirst by tracking down the
trouble.
2. The Problem of Securing a Movie-
The staff informed the children that an
attractive movie could be obtained from
town but the camp could not pay the whole
rental fee. The Rattlers and Eagles had to
overcome this financial obstacle through
intergroup negotiation.
3. The Camp-Out Problem-The entire
group was removed from the familiar camp
setting and thrown together to perform the
necessary tasks for an extended camp-out.
A number of planned interactions occurred
during this time, i.e., a truck which
&dquo;stalled&dquo; conveniently and required mass
effort to restart. Throughout the trip the
staff capitalized on similar, but truly spon-
taneous, incidents.
This Integration Phase of the experiment
was successful in reducing the existing ten-
sions between the groups and the research-
ers attribute the outcome to the interper-
sonal experiences generated by cooperation
in the achievement of goals requiring mu-
tual effort for their attainment. Hostility
reduction was described as the cum.ulative
effect of interaction around a series of su-
perordinate goals since no single incident
seemed to have turned the tide.
The experiment at Robbers Cave has
been responded to with unusual enthusiasm
by social scientists who have labelled it
&dquo;brilliant,&dquo; &dquo;a modem classic,&dquo; &dquo;unparal-
leled,&dquo; &dquo;ingenious,&dquo; etc. Despite the praise
that has been heaped upon it - praise I
agree is deserved-if we wish to use their
experience as an analogy for other groups
we must be aware of its limitations. It is
obvious that the behavior of somewhat
fewer than 22 carefully selected eleven-
year-old boys during a three-week session
at camp can be extrapolated to the larger
scene only with considerable caution. Fur-
ther, it has been suggested ( McNeil, 1961)
that a more appropriate analogical model
might be found in the study of delinquent
children for whom open hostility produces
less guilt, the concept of &dquo;fair play&dquo; is less
cloying, the response to implicit social crit-
icism is more contemptuous, and the drive
to power is woven more tightly into the
fabric of their being. With such raw ma-
terial, the consequent experimental broth
might resemble less the cup of friendship
than the devil’s brew. To explore another
dimension, what if this experiment were to
be repeated with children of Thailand,
79
China, Paraguay, or Nigeria? Would the
All-American-Happy-Ending have been as
predictable an outcome?
The combination of observations, judg-
ments, and test responses the authors em-
ployed to assess the rapidly shifting in-
group status relations and intergroup be-
havior of the combatants was necessarily
less than perfect and they are fully con-
scious of the flaws in their research vehicle.
Since the nature of the experiment was kept
secret from the children, the task faced by
the researchers was very much similar to
that posed for spies, i.e., how to convert
one’s observations into systematic and trust-
worthy conclusions.
A &dquo;what if&dquo; more crucial than the primi-
tive measures available to such a field study
has to do with the selection of superordi-
nate goals as the preferred means for re-
solving this test-tube-produced intergroup
hostility. (1) What if, rather, a suitably
unappetizing common enemy had been con-
jured up to redirect the angry energies of
the boys? (2) What if our cultural need
for individual achievement had been loosed
from its social leash to ravage the internal
cohesion of the groups? (3) What if se-
lected members of the Rattlers and the
Eagles had been inpsired to launch a hun-
ger strike for peace? ( 4 ) What if Osgood’s
(1959) plan of graduated reciprocation in
tension reduction had been initiated? (5)
What if the two groups had been prevailed
upon to establish a supemational agency to
regulate the intergroup tension (Stagner,
1961) ? The long list of possible &dquo;what ifs&dquo;
needs to be explored singly or in concert so
we can judge the relative effectiveness of
each and order them on some rough scale
of usefulness. It ought to be noted that the
concept of superordinate goals used in the
Robbers Cave experiment had a particular
twist to it. Since the children were una-
ware of the Machiavellian turn of mind of
the experimenters, they were deprived of
the freedom consciously to contribute to
the quality and extent of the reduction of
hostility. Peace, between the Rattlers and
Eagles, was an unconscious by-product of
what must have seemed to them to have
been only the normal ebb and flow of hu-
man relations. An experiment in which ed-
ucation for superordination was a part of
enlisting the conscious cooperation of the
antagonists might produce a cessation of
hostilities differing in kind and quality from
that achieved at Robbers Cave.
It is interesting that the &dquo;common enemy&dquo;
approach to the reduction of intergroup
hostility was attempted by these research-
ers in an earlier study (Sherif and Sherif,
1953). It proved to be a successful device
but an expensive one since it was a solu-
tion which relied on spreading the conflict
even further and involving a greater num-
ber of combatants. Something like a war
to drain off the feelings that lead to war.
Janis and Katz (1959) have made it
clear that the nature of the group struggle
acts as a conditioning factor in the success
that can be expected from various methods
used to attain peace. They suggest, for ex-
ample, that nonviolent means of conflict
resolution may be more applicable to fac-
tions within the same institution than to
contests between distant groups. It is diffi-
cult to characterize the enmity relationship
between the Rattlers and the Eagles since
the formal institutionalization of aggression
as an integral part of the structure of each
group was short-lived. If each of the groups
had operated as a solid unit for an extended
period of time the lure of superordinate
goals might have been reduced in direct
proportion to the degree of cohesion of
each ingroup. They were, essentially, new-
born nation states formed from the same
general culture but denied even a tribal
heritage.
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Another alternative which was consid-
ered and abandoned was that of disrupting
the ingroups by emphasizing individual
achievement and accomplishment. Even
had such an all-American plan succeeded it
seemed to promise little in the way of prac-
tical implications for the reduction of inter-
group tensions in state-sized groups. The
intrusion by an outsider into the leadership
pattern of the group was rejected for sim-
ilar reasons. The impossibility of &dquo;getting
to&dquo; a leader in the real world seemed enor-
mous and, in actuality, the experimenters
viewed leadership as a structure that both
guides and is led by the total group situ-
ation.
The design of this experimental attempt
to manipulate group hostility, by its very
nature, rejects certain explanations of inter-
group relations. Theories about national
character (war-like people), deep-seated,
innate instincts of aggression, the superior-
ity or inferiority of certain human groups,
the effect of individual frustration, or the
character of leadership are discarded as ap-
propriate causes of the total phenomenon
of intergroup anger. In this respect, the re-
search was designed to explore a limited
and select hypothesis.
At one point during the height of the
hostile excursions the groups were making
against one another, the Eagles raided and
wrecked the Rattlers’ cabin and then re-
turned to their own quarters where they
entrenched and prepared weapons (socks
filled with rocks) in anticipation of retalia-
tion by their victims. When the Rattlers dis-
covered this atrocity, their leader labelled
the Eagles (collectively) &dquo;Communists.&dquo;
This spontaneous epithet no doubt evoked
an adult smile but its significance may have
escaped the observers of this conflict in
microcosm. If, as Bronfenbrenner (1961)
has so clearly indicated, Russians and Amer-
icans hold &dquo;mirror images&dquo; of one another’s
motives and characteristics, we could spec-
ulate that such a scene could well have
taken place in Russia with the utterance
altered only to read, &dquo;Capitalistic war mon-
gers.&dquo; No research has yet tried to predict
the eventual impact of two such gigantic
cultures devoting themselves so assiduously
to forming populations composed exclu-
sively of adults who have known their &dquo;en-
emy&dquo; since childhood. The longer the
struggle continues, the greater will be the
proportion of such adults in each society
oriented emotionally and cognitively to the
&dquo;way in which one deals with enemies.&dquo; It
is exactly this continuous leveling of the
viewpoint of generation after generation
that promises to make a barren soil for ne-
gotiations in the future. It is this steady
solidifying of hostility that sets an upper
limit on the effectiveness of plans that seek
to assure peace by a simple increase in con-
tact or communication between the citizens
of each nation. We may, shortly, reach a
point of psychological no return such that
the expunging of such deeply rooted mass
hatred may only be possible as an after-
math of a catastrophe so fantastic that it
acts to bleach out even those emotions in-
grained during the formative years of
youth. The task of altering such fundamen-
tal perceptions has added to it the addi-
tional burden of a race against time. How
much time do we have before each culture
reaches a critical saturation point? If it
need happen only for one culture then it
becomes a clear instance of the devil tak-
ing the hindmost.
Scott (1958) suggested the process of
systematic &dquo;gentling&dquo; (petting and removal
from combat) of puppies, as a device for
teaching them to avoid aggressive interac-
tion with others and he proposes that a sim-
ilar program might work with children.
Our children, however, have been weaned
on a set of adult attitudes which would
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make unaggressive behavior a chaotic con-
tradiction in terms. Whenever we discuss
the daily news with our children we convey
to them some of the urgency of the ideolog-
ical conflict to which we are so sensitive
and to teach passivity as an accompaniment
to this set of ingrained hostile attitudes may
be highly unrealistic.
Research of the enterprising sort con-
ducted by Sherif and his associates ought
to serve as a model of one kind of approach
that behavioral scientists of a psycholog-
ical turn of mind can best accomplish. Such
efforts can provide only a segment of the
total answer, however. Katz (1961) frames
the Robbers Cave experiment in its proper
perspective by listing it as one of a series
of much needed types of research. As do
all really good experiments, the Sherif
work raises at least as many issues as it
resolves. Its experimental magic lies in the
degree to which it provokes new research
and a rethinking of the fundamental issues
of hostility reduction. This new and de-
tailed presentation of the research has a
kind of Mendelian timeliness about it. In-
ternational events have given a very prac-
tical cast to what at one time would have
been considered basic theoretical research
with little immediate application. Ideally,
a systematic plan of experimentation ought
to be undertaken to explore the effective-
ness of a variety of means for the reduction
of intergroup hostility with a variety of
groups having different characteristics and
natural histories. We suffer from an abun-
dance of speculation about such matters
and a dearth of actual experimentation.
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